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Abstract: 
In this paper we address the complex relationship between big data and human rights. 
Since this is a vast terrain, we restrict our focus in two main ways. First, we 
concentrate on big data applications in scientific research, mostly health-related 
research. And, second, we concentrate on two human rights: the familiar right to 
privacy and the less well-known right to science. Our contention is that human rights 
interact in potentially complex ways with big data, not only constraining it, but also 
enabling it in various ways; and, that such rights are dynamic in character, rather than 
fixed once-and-for-all, changing in their implications over time in line with changes 
in the context we inhabit, and also as they interact among themselves in jointly 
responding to the opportunities and risks thrown up by a changing world. 
Understanding this dynamic interaction of human rights is crucial for formulating an 
ethic tailored to the realities – the new capabilities and risks - of the rapidly evolving 
digital environment.   
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The Dynamics of Big Data and Human Rights: The Case of Scientific Research  
 
“Today it is increasingly assumed that the past and present 
of all of us – virtually every aspect of our lives- must be an 
open book; and that all such information about us can be 
not only put in files but merchandised freely. Business 
empires are being built on this merchandising of 
information about people’s private lives. The expectation 
that one has a right to be let alone- the whole idea that 
privacy is a right worth cherishing- seems to be evaporating 
among large segments of our population.”  Vance Packard, 
The Naked Society. 1964 [1] 
 
 
Ubiquitous Data, ubiquitous ethics:  
 
Digitization is rapidly transforming our lives, our social relations and even our 
understanding of our own humanity. The internet, mobile devices, massive data 
collections, and the analytics applied to them are propelling a digital revolution. 
Information technology is ubiquitous, and our engagement with it has risen to such a 
level of intensity that we now inhabit what has been termed the infosphere. [2] The 
World Economic Forum suggested that we are undergoing the 4th Industrial 
Revolution, its effects apparent in all aspects of our lives, and not only in the way 
knowledge is generated. Such is the “velocity, scope and systems impact” of 
digitization and global connectivity, that the current phase of our history is sharply 
distinct from previous ones. [3] The seductive power of this revolution has generated 
hopes and expectations about its potential benefits for all facets of our lives: from 
personal well-being and health, to sustainable development, the global economy, the 
environment and even governance.  
 
There are many inter-related dimensions to this revolution, but at the heart of it lie the 
increased capabilities to amass and store data and the analytical models applied to 
them for yielding knowledge. This, in short, is the Big Data phenomenon. Although it 
is notoriously hard to define Big Data with any tolerable degree of precision, it is 
certainly a powerful and seemingly inescapable phenomenon.[4] One manifestation of 
its dominance is the speed with which digital technologies are adopted. For example, 
it only took 10 years for smart phones to penetrate 40% of USA households compared 
with landline phones that needed 30 years to reach a mere 10% of American 
households. [5] Yet the apparently inexorable rise of big data has prompted a broad 
gamut of mixed and conflicting responses. At one end of the spectrum, we find 
unbridled enthusiasm about the proliferating opportunities to improve our lives; at the 
other end, there is increasing alarm at the pressures and distortions to which Big Data 
applications subject valued patterns of life. For every opportunity that big data 
presents, there seems to be a corresponding anxiety. That is not unusual in the history 
of technology, particularly in the history of transformative technologies such as 
computers. Already in the 1960s Vance Packard and others warned about the risks 
that computers along with other technologies pose on privacy. [1, 6] There is, 
however, something rather unprecedented going on here. The ubiquity, the pace of 
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development, and the very fact that big data has already become an unavoidable part 
of human life, set the scene for an intense and potentially destabilizing encounter 
between big data and ethical norms. For many, this is far beyond an encounter, it is 
rather a brutal head-on collision, for example, between big data applications and the 
norms protecting individual privacy. [7] 
 
The Snowden revelations about government surveillance confirmed growing fears 
about how certain uses of big data can undermine not just privacy, but ultimately 
trust, democracy and liberty. [8] The disturbing stream of reports about hacked 
databases, data kidnapping and other cybercrime stoked fears of a new vulnerability 
in the digital world Can we harness the potential of big data while keeping faith with 
our values? Do such values need to be “translated” for the new digital environment? 
If the way we live our lives is undergoing such transformations, are our existing 
ethical values still relevant? Many have claimed that privacy, for example, is obsolete 
in today’s world, partly because it is impossible to achieve and partly because it does 
not fit with modern culture. [7] Do we have to choose between big data and the 
ethical outlook that values such as privacy represent? Or should we turn to new values 
for guidance? Ultimately the central question is this: if big data is here to stay, in 
some sense, what kind of big data society do we want to have and how can we best 
achieve it?  
 
On the popular way of understanding the situation, we are often thrown into a moral 
battleground. Typically the appeal to ethics is cast as a conservative gesture, one 
hostile to scientific progress. However, it is profoundly misleading to think of ethics 
as simply a series of 'constraints' on the pursuit of scientific knowledge. For example, 
the pursuit of health research through big data, insofar as it is justified, is justified 
primarily in ethical terms. We see this when we adopt a sufficiently expansive 
understanding of the 'ethical'. 'Ethics', on this view, include goods that we have 
reason, and sometimes even an obligation, to pursue, such as the good of knowledge 
that can be used to bring about significant improvements in health. On this 
understanding, health research is an ethical enterprise from the very outset, 
being geared towards public goods such as knowledge and health. Ethics is not simply 
a series of “roadblocks” on the path to scientific knowledge, but part of the ultimate 
raison d’etre of the journey itself. After all, it would be deeply uncharitable to regard 
scientists engaged with big data as merely pursuing their narrow self-interest, whether 
defined in terms of monetary enrichment, satisfaction of curiosity, or career 
advancement. Instead, they are seeking public goods, goods that benefit all, such as 
scientific knowledge, which is both intrinsically valuable and also instrumentally 
valuable as a means of realizing goods such as health, education, enjoyment, 
friendship, and so on, in virtue of its technical applications. It is itself an ethical 
imperative to foster these goods. But there are, of course, ethical considerations 
bearing on how we may properly pursue these goods; in particular, constraints 
embodied in a variety of norms, including very centrally human rights. 
 
In this paper we seek to address the complex relationship between big data and human 
rights. Since this is a vast terrain, we restrict our focus in two ways. First, we 
concentrate on big data applications in scientific research, mostly health-related 
research. And, second, we concentrate on two human rights: the familiar right to 
privacy and the less well-known right to science. Our contention is that human rights 
interact in potentially complex ways with big data applications, not only constraining 
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them, but also enabling them in various ways; and, that they are dynamic in 
character, rather than fixed once-and-for-all, changing in their implications over time 
in line with changes in the context we inhabit, including the dangers and opportunities 
that confront us, and the knowledge and technological capacities at our disposal for 
meeting them. Moreover, to this interactive dynamic between big data and human 
rights we must add another such relationship between human rights themselves. At 
this second level, we explore how big data developments stimulate interactions 
between the rights to science and privacy themselves that affect both the content of 
these rights and the ways in which they may be productively exercised. 
 
 
 
Right to privacy, right to science. 
 
To get an initial fix on the rights to privacy and science, we can take as a starting-
point the formulations given to them in some leading international instruments. These 
formulations, either as treaty provisions or as declarations subsequently incorporated 
into customary international law, have the force of binding international law. 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Article 12.  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. [9] 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
Article 17 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.  
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. [10] 
 
 
The human right to privacy is a familiar one, even if, as with many other human 
rights, there are controversies surrounding its normative content and how it may be 
‘traded-off’ against competing values, including potentially competing rights such as 
the right to security. Leaving these debates to one side, we shall proceed on the basis 
that the human right to privacy exists, and that one of the central interests it protects is 
the ability of individuals to develop their personality and to exert reasonable control 
over how they present themselves to others. [11, 12] Our focus is on ways in which 
big data developments bear on such privacy interests and the extent to which they 
necessitate modifications in the requirements of the right to privacy.  
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 27.  
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
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resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
[9] 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Article 15: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:  
a. To take part in cultural life; 
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
c. To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
[13] 
 
Unlike the right to privacy, the “right to science” is an unfamiliar but potentially far-
reaching right, one that has received comparatively little sustained attention from 
human rights scholars. [14] Our focus here is on the first component of this right: both 
the idea that everyone has a right to benefit from scientific advances, and in the idea 
that people have a right actively to participate in scientific inquiry, rather than just to 
be passive beneficiaries of advances made by professional scientists. The 
participatory aspect of the right to science is liable to be overlooked, but it emerges 
most clearly in the formulation provided by the Universal Declaration, especially if 
we treat ‘the cultural life of the community’ as comprising as elements both ‘the arts’ 
and also ‘science’, as the second half of Article 27(1) suggests that we should. The 
participatory dimension of the right to science has been recognized by a large number 
of interpreters and official bodies, and perhaps most strikingly and presciently in a 
UNESCO report of 1952 in which it is stated: “The first question of all to be 
considered in relation to the present state of scientific knowledge, is: in what ways 
can the non-specialist take an active part in scientific advancement (experiments, 
observation of nature, sociological observations, etc.)? How may active participation 
of this sort benefit the individual and science? How can it be encouraged and 
promoted?” More recently, the notion of participation was highlighted in the report 
by the UN’s Special Rapporteur in the field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed. In a 
2012 report, exploring the normative content of the right to science, she argued that 
participating in science should be understood as participation “in the whole of 
science”, not merely its products, and went on to state explicitly that the right includes 
“opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise [..].” 
 
 
It is precisely the ‘participatory’ dimension of the right to science that constitutes its 
main ‘value added’ in relation to other, more familiar, economic, social and cultural 
rights. It explains why the right to benefit from scientific advance is not already 
subsumed within the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, housing 
etc. (CITE to Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). The right to science underlines a particular 
kind of benefit to ordinary individuals that might otherwise be neglected: not simply 
passively to receive the benefit of the fruits of scientific investigation, but to play a 
part in the securing them by engaging in such investigation, even if one is not a 
professional scientist.  
 
 
Thus, although a right of popular participation is a familiar idea in the realm of 
democratic politics, the right to science extends it significantly further, with the result 
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that participation infuses and potentially radically transforms our modes of scientific 
practice. Information and communication technologies have enabled increasing 
numbers of people to exercise their right to participation, sometimes as part of the 
phenomenon dubbed “citizen science”. [15] More specifically, in the area of health 
research, devices that collect and transmit data about individuals are offering means 
that facilitate the exercise of the right.  
 
Both the human right to science and to privacy that are discussed in this paper are to 
be found in formal human rights instruments, and are binding norms of international 
law, as well as being embodied in diverse ways in the laws of regional and domestic 
jurisdictions. Behind these legal manifestations, however, lies human rights conceived 
first and foremost as moral rights possessed by all human beings, simply in virtue of 
their humanity. It is these background norms of human rights morality that control the 
proper interpretation of the rights to privacy and science in human rights law. [16] 
 
Understanding human rights 
 
The language of human rights is popular across cultural boundaries and carries 
considerable rhetorical power. Drawing on this language can help mobilize the force 
of public opinion in bringing about change and, to the extent that human rights are 
enshrined as justiciable entitlements, whether in treaties, constitutions or ordinary 
laws, they can be secured through litigation in the courts.  Ethical and policy debates 
around big data and health research and practice often draw on contested ideas about 
human rights. [17] But although popular in this way, both the meaning of human 
rights claims, and the way in which they are grounded, often remain stubbornly 
unclear. This lack of clarity encourages a trend to enlist the language of human rights 
for any cause thought to be worthwhile, with the consequent unruly proliferation of 
human rights claims and the debasement of the currency of human rights. Clarity 
about what human rights are and what role they can play remains crucial for 
preserving their normative power and enabling them to be effective policy guides. In 
the name of clarity, we offer the following four observations about human rights 
conceived, in the first instance, as moral rights possessed by all human beings simply 
in virtue of their humanity.  
 
Grounding  
The first concerns the grounding of human rights; or, put differently, the 
considerations we need to appeal to in order to justify belief in the existence of a 
human right. A widely endorsed candidate for the grounding value is human dignity 
[9] But this notion is often appealed to as little more than a place-holder, its content 
left hopelessly vague. In this vein, the European Data Protection Supervisor has 
asserted recently that human dignity should be the foundational element of a Big Data 
ethics framework, on the basis that human dignity is the foundation of human rights: 
“the dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but also is a 
foundation for subsequent freedoms and rights, including the rights to privacy and to 
the protection of personal data.” [18] But even in this concrete example, the Opinion 
shied away of explaining what human dignity is and how it grounds human rights.  
 
In seeking greater clarity, it is useful to distinguish at least two things that might be 
meant by human dignity. The first is the inherent value that attaches to being a 
member of the human species [19, 20] irrespective of whether one is in a position to 
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actualize the characteristic capacities of human beings. On this view, a newly born 
baby, a normally functioning adult, and someone in a permanent vegetative state, all 
possess the value of human dignity, and do so in equal measure. Although this is an 
important value, it is evidently too limited to generate anything approaching the 
extensive lists of human rights we find in leading human rights instruments. Hence, 
some have appealed to a second interpretation of ‘dignity’, understood now as the 
value of being a “normative agent”: one who has the capacity freely to choose and 
pursue their life-defining projects. [11] On this view, crucial to the grounding of 
human rights is the value of personhood (the ability to make autonomous choices, 
liberty to pursue choices made). But once we have admitted this universal human 
interest, it seems artificial to draw the line at personhood. A human right – like the 
right to privacy – appears to protect not only personhood, but also other interests, 
such as our interest in not being humiliated, in forming and maintaining intimate 
relationships, and so on. Moreover, we can readily imagine human beings who are not 
normative agents, such as those who are suffering from the advanced stages of senile 
dementia, having their right to privacy violated, e.g. by publishing intimate 
photographs, or detailed medical histories, on the internet. Hence, our view is that 
human rights are standardly grounded in a multiplicity of considerations – dignity in 
the inherent value and personhood senses, to be sure, but potentially an open-ended 
series of additional universal interests, such as freedom from pain, knowledge, health, 
accomplishment, friendship, play, and so on. [21]  
 
What we have said here about the right to privacy applies equally to the right to 
science. The latter also finds its basis in a multiplicity of interests that it serves. These 
include: the interest in acquiring knowledge of the world, the interest in achievement 
(where this knowledge is acquired through one’s own successful efforts), the interest 
in community with others (participation in science typically involves cooperation with 
other colleagues towards the shared goal of generalizable scientific knowledge). In 
both cases, we believe that a pluralistic grounding of human rights, rather than one 
narrowly focused on human dignity (in either or both senses distinguished above), 
offers the most satisfying justification of these human rights. 
 
 
Content  
Our second observation relates to the content of human rights  - what they require of 
us, and how this can change over time. A moral right always involves one or more 
counterpart duties (or obligations, we use these terms interchangeably), which is the 
normative content of the right. The duty specifies what the duty-bearer must do or 
refrain from doing in order to comply with the right. On this view, human rights are 
not to be identified simply with the interests that ground them (e.g. health, autonomy, 
knowledge); instead, they concern the duties generated by these underlying interests. 
The process of going from interests to the duties they ground is a complex one, but it 
is clearly highly sensitive to constraints of feasibility. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’, with the 
result that a person can only be under a duty that it is feasible to impose on them. 
Minimally, it must be generally possible for duty-bearers to do what they have a duty 
to do: there can be no duty to do the impossible. So, even if in theory certain security 
measures – such as foolproof anonymization of data - could enhance my interest in 
privacy, it makes no sense to say I have a right to them if there is no way to 
implement those measures given the current and foreseeable state of technological 
capacities. Moreover, even if it is possible, imposing a duty to take the measures must 
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not be unduly burdensome. So, for example, my interest in privacy does not impose 
an obligation on the police not to require me to disclose my identity to them if they 
find me behaving suspiciously. Recognising such a right would be unduly 
burdensome in relation to other important values, such as the detection and prevention 
of crime, which also bear on the protection of human rights. In order to determine 
whether I have a right to certain privacy protections, we need to ask whether it is 
unduly burdensome to impose a duty to provide them, given the costs they might 
involve. As this example reveals, the process of deriving human rights is holistic in 
character. Any given obligation corresponding to a human right must be specified in 
light of other such obligations, to ensure that as a general matter they are all in 
principle jointly feasible. In this case, the right to privacy must be specified in a way 
that is generally consistent with a robust right to security, which may be in some 
circumstances permissibly upheld by requiring people to disclose their identity to 
police officers. 
 
Now, a vital point here is that our assessments of what is possible and not unduly 
burdensome change over time in response to changed circumstances, e.g. the 
emergence of new forms of economic and social organization, technical and scientific 
innovation, etc. Hence, there may come into being rights that did not exist before e.g. 
a right to internet access, as proposed by Frank La Rue, the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. [22] 
Existing rights also can change in shape, e.g. the right to health may encompass new 
forms of treatment as their cost declines over time, thereby rendering the duty to 
supply that treatment not unduly burdensome. So, although human rights are uniform 
in content at any given moment in time, i.e. they must be rights possessed in equal 
measure by all human beings, the schedule of rights and the content of any given right 
can change over time in response to changes over time in what it is feasible to deliver 
as a matter of right. Presumably, this is part of the explanation of why the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights contains an ampler list of rights – including socio-
economic rights – than many earlier rights documents. It was simply judged feasible, 
in the post-War era, to expand the demands of human rights in this way. 
 
Duty bearers 
The third observation concerns the bearers of the duties imposed by human rights. In 
addition to the task of specifying the content of the duties associated with human 
rights, it is necessary to allocate them fairly to agents who are capable of discharging 
them. Human rights law, especially international human rights law, treats the state as 
the exclusive, or at least the primary, duty bearer in relation. However, there is 
nothing in the underlying idea of a moral human right that restricts duty-bearers to the 
state. Just as there is a plurality of considerations that ground human rights (from the 
'input' side), there is also a diversity of potential duty-bearers (the 'output' side). There 
is no reason in principle to restrict duty bearers of human rights exclusively or 
primarily to states. Some rights, such as the right to a fair trial, might be primarily 
targeted at the state. But non-state actors, ranging from individuals to transnational 
corporations, may also bear human rights obligations. It is a further question what sort 
of legal or other structure we should employ to give formal expression, and social 
efficacy, to these obligations. For example, the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights directly impose an obligation to respect human rights on all 
corporations. [23] But they are not legally enforceable obligations, but at best part of 
a ‘soft law’ that can help co-ordinate expectations and enhance compliance with 
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human rights norms overall.  
 
This latter issue is of special relevance to big data for several reasons. Corporations 
are engaged in massive data collection that stretches over many national jurisdictions; 
they possess powerful computational tools that are opaque to outsiders; given the 
accelerating pace of developments in big data, national laws designed in the analog 
era may be inadequate in protecting rights affected by big data. Big Data companies 
have responsibilities to respect privacy rights even when law does not explicitly 
demand such protections, as it might be when legislators are racing to fill gaps created 
by new technological capabilities. Corporations also have responsibilities to respect 
the right to science.  For example those with control over large scientific data 
repositories tend to have exclusive rights to their use. Even if they exploit the data for 
scientific purposes themselves, they may have obligations to make such data sets 
accessible to other researchers for science to advance. If obstacles to sharing impede 
scientific progress, they may also impede our right to share in, and enjoy, its benefits.  
 
Not exhaustive  
Our final observation is as important as it is neglected. Although human rights are 
weighty moral standards, they are not exhaustive of our ethical standards, not even of 
that sub-set of ethical standards that should guide and inform law and public policy. 
To begin with, there are obligations that are not associated with rights, such as 
obligations to oneself (e.g. to develop one’s cognitive capacities, or at least not 
wantonly to destroy them, or to refrain from making public disclosures of certain 
kinds of personal information). There are also obligations of charity and solidarity. 
The breach of these obligations constitutes a wrong, but no one’s rights are violated 
when this happens. In addition to the domain of obligations, law and public policy 
needs to be responsive to a whole range of ethical concerns, including the fulfillment 
of human needs, economic prosperity, the preservation of nature, the furtherance of 
the common good, even beyond the point at which any of these concerns generate 
obligations, let alone rights-based obligations owed to some individual.  
 
It is vital to underscore this point, since otherwise we lapse into the error of pressing 
human rights to do all the ethical work that needs to be done, which risks distorting 
them while simultaneously marginalizing non-rights-based consideration. The 
specific implication of this point for the present topic is that we should not expect a 
suitably comprehensive ethical framework for big data to be grounded exclusively in 
human rights considerations. On the contrary, other sorts of considerations will need 
to be included alongside human rights. 
 
Consider, as an illustration of these points, the right to privacy. Many make the dual 
error of supposing that the ‘ethics of big data’ reduces to the ethical requirements 
concerned with privacy, and further that these ethical requirements of privacy all boil 
down to respect for the right to privacy. But much more than privacy matters, such as 
the positive ethical goals around health, knowledge, security, etc. that big data can 
serve.  And, even when privacy matters, it matters in ways that go beyond the right to 
privacy. One example is the duty to preserve one’s own privacy which, not being 
owed to another person but to oneself, is not a rights-based duty. (We take it to be a 
conceptual truth that we do not have rights against ourselves). Yet clearly people have 
good reasons, often of self-interest, not to undermine their privacy interests, and 
sometimes these reasons rise to the level of moral duty that it would be morally wrong 
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to contravene. Imagine a university student who seriously damages his prospects of 
future employment, or of playing a constructive role in society, by posting online all 
the minute details of his personal history, psychological states, romantic 
entanglements, medical history, etc. The student may have a right of freedom of 
speech to do all these things, yet we might feel uneasy about his doing them, even to 
the point of believing he is acting wrongfully. If he does have a duty to respect his 
own privacy in certain ways, third parties – e.g. Facebook – may bear a derivative 
duty not to encourage or facilitate his contravention of that duty, as well as a duty to 
help him minimize the impact of these indiscretions (one line of thought leading to 
the much-discussed, but rather limited, ‘right to be forgotten’).[24]  
 
Another, related factor, is that living in a society where privacy is respected is a 
common good. A common good is something – such as a shared language – that 
benefits everyone in a community, benefits them in the same way (e.g. by furnishing a 
means of communication), and which is non-rivalrous, in the sense that its benefiting 
some is not in competition with its benefiting others (e.g. my benefit from using the 
English language in no way competes with the benefit you get from using it). But a 
culture of privacy’s being a common good goes beyond merely securing people’s 
rights to privacy. In a culture that is solicitous of privacy, for example, people tend to 
avoid asking personal questions of people with whom they are not on close terms. 
There is no need to think that such ‘forward’ behavior is a violation of the right to 
privacy in order to regard it as morally deficient. This suggests that there is a common 
good of living in a privacy-respecting society that goes beyond the good of living in a 
society where the right to privacy is widely respected. The same point can be made 
about a culture in which there is widespread participation by citizens in scientific 
research. Although this is a common good, the good does not simply consist in 
respecting each individual’s right to science. Even in a society where people’s right to 
science was fully respected, they might nonetheless choose not to exercise that right. 
The common good of a culture of scientific participation is only realized when large 
numbers of people regularly exercise their right to science by engaging in various 
forms of scientific research. But the exercise of that right is not itself something that 
can for the most part be demanded as of right, no more than we can demand that 
people exercise their right to free speech in order to produce works that help sustain 
the common good of a vibrant literary culture. So, in fostering a culture of citizen 
participation in science, we need to do more than securing people’s right to science.   
 
Having set out this understanding of human rights, we proceed now to consider our 
chosen rights and how they bear on big data health research. We try to bring out, in 
particular, the point that human rights are dynamic, changing in their implications 
over time, and that they are inter-active, in the sense that what they require and how 
they are exercised depends on relations among rights.  
 
Rights in Action: 
 
The right to science and the right to privacy may appear to be on a collision course 
with each other. The right to science demands that opportunities be made available to 
participate in, and benefit from, scientific advances. In some areas of science, 
however, such progress can only be achieved through the use data with personally 
identifiable information. Is the right to science in conflict with the right to privacy in 
such cases? Is there a duty to enable the use of identifiable data and at the same time a 
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rival duty to protect the privacy of those who might be identified? If these duties are 
in conflict, what is to be done? It would be odd to suppose that one right can be 
generally secured only if another is systematically violated. Part of the point of 
anything being a right, imposing corresponding obligations on others, is that the latter 
are not regularly trumped by competing considerations. Accordingly, before 
embracing the drastic conclusion of systematic conflict between the two rights, we 
need to take a step back and explore other possibilities.  
 
Specifying the duties imposed by human rights, as we saw above, is an inherently 
holistic process: it is a matter of solving a simultaneous equation with multiple 
variables. Human rights impose duties, and duties are stringent moral reasons that are 
not regularly or easily overridden by other considerations, including by other duties. 
To think of human rights as habitually, as opposed to exceptionally, subject to trade-
offs is to misunderstand their nature as sources of duties. It follows that the duties 
associated with human rights must be generally jointly satisfiable, with conflicts 
arising only in exceptional, emergency-like, circumstances. So, apparent tensions like 
the one between the rights to privacy and to science, from which we began, are 
largely to be pre-empted at the stage of giving an adequate specification of the duties 
associated with each human right. Adopting such a holistic approach, we understand 
human rights as interacting with their environment (e.g. a social setting in which new 
capabilities are constantly emerging) and also with each other, in the process of 
specifying their content. We offer some examples here to illustrate the interaction and 
how it shapes the duties that human rights impose in a way that pre-empts systematic 
conflicts, even if it does not entirely do away with conflicts involving human rights.  
 
The maintenance of electronic health records (EHRs) is increasingly becoming 
standard practice in health care. The primary purpose of EHRs is to capture and store 
patient information that is used in the clinical care of the patient. But EHRs provide 
an invaluable source of data that can be readily mined for a variety of research 
purposes.  EHR data from a large number of patients can be pooled together, linked to 
other databases, and queried with fertile scientific questions. To date, EHR data are 
under-utilized in health research and public health practice relative to the benefits 
which they are capable of generating. A variety of justifications have been offered for 
this, [25] but a heavily cited one is privacy. Depending on the query that is put to the 
data, the answers may reveal patterns, behaviors, health risks etc. about particular 
individuals or groups. Such revelations can potentially have adverse consequences for 
these individuals or groups (for example, discrimination, stigma etc.) Protecting 
privacy interests, by keeping their health information confidential, safeguards them 
from the risk of discrimination and other harms. However, making this information 
accessible to third parties is necessary for many scientific advances, and it can further 
people’s interests to share in, and benefit from, such advances. 
 
The usual way of easing some of the tension here is by asking individuals if they are 
willing to take a privacy risk in order to contribute to securing an advance in scientific 
knowledge. This is typically done by means of informed consent procedures 
authorizing access to one’s health information for secondary uses. Another means of 
easing the tension is through anonymization of data, although in many cases health 
research may actually require identifiable data in order to succeed. In the current big 
data context, however, both of these approaches are of limited utility. [27, 27] 
Individuals cannot fully control the exact direction of the information flow given 
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various practical reasons, such as the impracticability of seeking and giving 
authorization every time a research question emerges, or because broad consent for 
general data uses is not morally robust enough to cover quite unanticipated uses. 
Anonymization, on the other hand, may be undesirable depending on the research 
project, and in any case re-identification may eventually become possible as new 
capabilities or new computational methods emerge.  [29, 29]  
 
One way of engaging with this problem is as if it were a zero-sum game: going ahead 
with the proposed research, which may facilitate enjoyment of the right to science, 
requires us to justifiably override the demands of the right to privacy. But this way of 
looking at the matter imports the very problematic assumption that human rights 
systematically admit of trade-offs, including against each other [11, 19]. But if a 
privacy right were truly being justifiably overridden in this case, would this not at 
least demand some compensation for the person who sustains the privacy harm? This 
what happens, for example, when a person’s property rights are justifiably overridden 
through compulsory acquisition by the state in time of public emergency, such as a 
war. But this will strike many as a counter-intuitive analogy.  
 
A more promising way of looking at the matter is to ask whether the right to privacy 
is to be specified in a way that it actually poses significant obstacles to the right to 
science, or the other way around. There is a subtle, but crucial, distinction that needs 
to be noted here in thinking about how changed circumstances can bear on human 
righs compliance. Sometimes the changed circumstances leave the content of the right 
– the associated duties – unaffected, generating change only in the means available 
for fulfilling those duties. So, for example, the advent of the Internet provides a new 
means, among others, for the state to comply with its duty to publicise the laws that it 
enacts. But sometimes changing circumstances can have a more radical effect: they 
can change the content of a given right by altering assessments of possibility and 
burden that go to the specification of the duties associated with a right. 
 
The content of the right to privacy, or of the right to science, is to be ascertained 
against the background of the advantages and limitations of the novel digital 
environment. If it is impossible for individuals to have absolute control over the 
information flow of their data within the health care system, is it possible to maintain 
that there is a duty on the part of data users to ensure that such form of control exists? 
Or should the lack of such any option to control and authorize the information flow, 
automatically eliminate the possibility of data access by researchers? The latter would 
surely be an obstacle to securing the right to science as it will diminish the possibility 
of scientific advance. Duties of privacy protection in the digital world need to be 
spelled out and may not entirely correspond with identical duties before the advent of 
digitization. UN resolution 68/167 on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age 
affirmed that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.” 
[30] The question, however, remains as to whether these “same rights” change in their 
normative implications in this new context and, if so, in what way. Our suggestion is 
that the duties that correspond to the rights in the digital context are best seen as 
having undergone a change in content.  
 
Furthermore, we also note here that the assumption that the online/offline contrast is 
binary is itself highly problematic. People seem to live in a continuum of on/off line 
with the result that it is difficult to draw sharp and meaningful lines between the two. 
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This must also affect the way we conceive of our rights and their protection. The 
blurred on/offline boundary has destabilizing repercussions for the private/public 
distinction. There is a growing body of literature exploring this phenomenon.  People 
are thought to have become more open in the way they deal with personal information 
online. At the same time, empirical data show that people remain concerned about 
their privacy and want to be able to exercise their right to privacy. This phenomenon 
has been termed the privacy paradox, but the air of paradox is can be readily 
dispelled. [31] One can be open and decide to share while still considering the right to 
have the option to use privacy protections to be an important one. [32]  After all, it 
can be part of a right that one has the power to waive it, giving others through one’s 
free choice access to personal information that would otherwise be out of bounds. For 
example, people choose to share certain information within certain online contexts, 
e.g. within a circle of friends, or with their physicians. Typically, many would like the 
flow of information to stop there, and not to extend to the next circle involving 
algorithms hungry to combine them with other data in order to pursue some alien 
purpose. 
 
Let us return now to the right to privacy in health research. The interests that it serves, 
for example, the interests in non-discrimination and non-stigmatization, do not 
necessarily have to be served through conferring on the right-holder exclusive control 
over the flow of data. (Assuming, indeed, that they can always be served by means of 
consent, which is far from obvious). Another way to protect such interests is by 
shifting the focus onto the conditions under which certain uses of data are 
permissible. [33] For example, data-driven research (like all other research) must be 
socially valuable and its benefits ought to be shared fairly among the community; data 
users should not subject data to queries that create certain risks, and if such risks arise, 
the information gleaned is not to be released to any parties that might use it to harm 
the person in question; data users commit to full transparency about data uses and 
related actions, and so on. Furthermore, one’s interests in not being harmed through 
stigmatization etc. maybe be better protected by means of laws that punish 
discriminatory treatment, or through other means that serve as deterrent to 
discrimination, including compensation mechanisms if discrimination does take place 
on the basis of the relevant information. The duties to protect privacy rights in the 
current context seem to be better placed downstream (at the data use stage) in the 
process, rather early on (data collection, use authorization) pursuing an impossible 
task. 
 
This approach looks at privacy interests only as far as they concern certain harms 
resulting from privacy loss. There is of course a further consideration here: even if 
there is no harm of stigmatization or discrimination resulting from privacy loss, does 
the person have an autonomy interest in no one under any circumstances accessing 
personal information about them without their authorization? And, is this the kind of 
interest that generates a duty to protect it? It would be erroneous to think this is 
always the case. This is because it is precisely “circumstances” that strongly affect 
how we should balance various ethical considerations. Even if one has an interest in 
not having their personal information ever accessed without permission, the 
circumstances can potentially determine whether this is an interest that generates a 
duty to protect it. Imagine the scenario in which health data are accessed, linked, and 
analysed in ways that identification and the sort of harms associated with it are 
eliminated, or that there are sufficient mechanisms in place to remedy such harms 
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should they occur. Imagine also that there is groundbreaking knowledge to be derived 
from such an analysis, for example, in genomic research. In this scenario, although 
the person whose data are accessed has an interest in not having his data accessed, yet 
it is plausible that no duty owed to him exists not to access the data if the conditions 
set out above are satisfied. The common good of health knowledge here is the type of 
“circumstance” that can legitimately limit the right to privacy in this particular way. 
To clarify: the right to privacy is protected through protection of various underlying 
interests, but the duty to protect such interest can take variety of forms. Moreover, 
some of those interests protected by privacy may not generate a duty of protection 
owed to the individual, given the circumstances.  
  
 
Let’s turn now to the right to science. As discussed above this right engages 
everyone’s interests in sharing in and benefiting from scientific progress, but it also 
engages their interests in participating in scientific research that may lead to such 
progress. When data base controllers refuse to share data for health research, they 
defend their case not only on the grounds of privacy protections (which they think 
they owe to the individuals whose data are in the database) but also on the grounds of 
their own rights of intellectual property. There is a long-standing debate as to whether 
data can actually be “owned”, and if so, who is the morally legitimate owner. [34] A 
greater degree of consensus exists, however, on the assignment of intellectual 
property rights over the products created by means of the use of a data set, e.g. 
copyright in a scientific research paper. The right to science has been mostly invoked 
in the latter sense and in defense of robust intellectual property regimes. Such 
regimes, however, can severely impede the dissemination of, and access to, scientific 
knowledge and scientific advances on the part of the ordinary public. Limiting access 
to data or strictly controlling knowledge dissemination on IP grounds, risks according 
disproportionate weight to one part of the right, thereby making the other part of it 
impossible or unduly burdensome to exercise. [35]. Granted that there might be 
several IP interests in data and their outcomes, the question is whether all of these 
interests nonetheless generate the duty to protect them, when in fact their protection 
will significantly impair our capacity to serve other interests or exercise other rights.  
 
A less familiar aspect of the right to science is its reference to participation in the 
cultural life of the community, including “sharing in” scientific advances. One 
interpretation of this aspect includes the right of everyone to have the opportunity to 
make a contribution to scientific advances through participating in scientific research. 
We have argued in other work that this interpretation offers provides a strong 
normative underpinning for the so-called citizen science movement. [15] People 
without formal scientific credentials have a right to engage in scientific inquiry, and 
there is a societal duty to enable them to do so. With the new capabilities that the 
internet and big data analytics offer, one form of participation is through people 
collecting and sharing their own health data for the purpose of scientific discovery. 
There are numerous platforms (public, private, or public-private) that offer such 
possibilities to willing individuals. New technologies enable people to exercise their 
right to science in novel ways. People are equipped to make contributions simply in 
virtue of possessing mobile devices that collect and transmit geolocation data, or 
because they can instantly connect with many other people online around a common 
interest.  
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However, in debates surrounding the ethics of this newly flourishing form of citizen 
science, concerns have been raised about protections that should be afforded to those 
who undertake such activity. A recurrent anxiety targets privacy protections. 
Sometimes citizen science projects may fail ethics review, because privacy 
protections are not deemed up to scratch. Often standards and procedures of ethics 
review, which were designed for scientific projects that did not involve big data or 
citizen science dimensions, are uncritically applied to these new models of research. 
Of course, people who are willing to exercise their right to participation in scientific 
discovery still have privacy interests. The capabilities of the new digital context offer 
ample possibilities for technological solutions to both privacy and participation. 
Notably, these new capabilities can enable people to make privacy choices through 
tools that offer granular options of sharing and also enable them to determine their 
desired degree of contribution to a given scientific project. Offering people the 
possibility options finely attuned to their preferences, cultural identities and life 
circumstances can assist them in exercising their rights. The duty therefore here takes 
a positive form, requiring the provision of opportunities rather than simply demanding 
that we refraining from doing certain things. Moreover, an additional duty potentially 
arises here beyond making such options available. People should be given 
information about existing options and offered support in exploring them, for 
example, through tools and aids that help them grasp the contours of the new privacy 
environment and the capabilities that enable participation. In other words, for people 
to be able to exercise their rights of science and privacy in an informed way, they 
need to be informed and supported in doing so.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Big data, we are repeatedly told, has enormous untapped potential as an approach to 
scientific research. A serious challenge arises, however, in realising this potential. It 
will require the development of an ethic tailored to the new realities – the new 
capabilities and risks - of the rapidly evolving digital environment. A wide range of 
ethical principles – central among them, the human rights we have discussed here - 
will need to inform the ethics of big data in scientific research. But these principles 
are not fixed and pre-existing templates that can be simply mechanically imposed on 
the new environment in a cookie-cutter fashion. Instead, the principles themselves are 
undergoing a dynamic process of evolution as they interact with the changing social 
and technological environment, and also as they interact among themselves in jointly 
responding to the opportunities and risks thrown up by a changing world. In this 
paper, we have offered a sketch of what it would mean to start taking the complex 
dynamics of big data and human rights seriously. 
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